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Chapter 11’s Silver Bullet and the Search for Liquidity
Jonathan Goodelman
I. INTRODUCTION
The failure of Lehman Brothers sent the global financial sector into complete
disarray, which hastened the biggest global economic meltdown the modern world has
ever seen. In order to prevent further catastrophe, the United States, through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), spent $700 billion in taxpayer money to bail out banks
after the financial crisis.1 Congress responded to this highly controversial bailout and the
demand for legislation by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”).2 This legislation is put forth in
order to address the idea that these institutions are “too-big-to-fail.”3
According to the Dodd-Frank Act’s title page, the statute’s purpose is "[t]o
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial service practices,
and for other purposes."4 Particularly, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the



J.D. Candidate, 2016 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2011 Stony Brook University. Special
thanks to Professor Stephen J. Lubben for his guidance throughout the writing of this Comment.
1 Bob Ivory talk, The True Cost of the Bank Bailout, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/economy/the-true-cost-of-the-bank-bailout/3309/.
2 See generally Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer: What You
Need to Know Now, vol. XXXI, No. 7, A M. BANKR. INST . L.J. 34 (2012); see also Bruce Grohsgal, Case in
Brief Against,“Chapter 14,” vol. XXXIIIA M. BANKR. INST . L.J. 44 (2014).
3 Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case against the Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills: Contingency Planning
Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 32 (2012) (defining “too-big-to-fail” as the
“problem caused when certain multinational financial institutions are so large that their insolvency could
shake the entire financial system and the economy”); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail:
Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1698, 1726–27 (2006) (explaining that the term “too-big-to-fail” has received a lot of attention in the last two
decades).
4 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
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Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”).5 The OLA is established to liquidate failing
financial firms and simultaneously prevent the liquidation from disrupting the market
place.6 Supporters of the OLA claim that taxpayer bailouts are a thing of the past because
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has now been given the power to
place a failing financial firm within their receivership.7 Once in receivership, the FDIC
winds the financial firm down efficiently and orderly without forcing taxpayers to foot the
bill.8

Supporters argue because the FDIC can facilitate the liquidation without taxpayer

funds, the “too-big-to fail” problem is relinquished.9 The presumption of ending the “too
big to fail” phenomenon has sparked an active debate on whether it is wise to entrust
another regulatory body (considering the Federal Reserves regulations did not prevent the
failure), with the difficult task of resolving it, when the proper mode of resolution lies in
the federal bankruptcy system.10
Bankruptcy is favorable to an OLA receivership because it allows for unassisted
failure of a financial firm. Unassisted failure ensures that the government will not step in
to bail out a financial firm in the event of distress. Furthermore, if a bailout is no longer
an option, institutions are prevented from taking risks with the belief that they will be
rescued in the event they face financial distress. 11 Moreover, by taking away the

5

Mark A. McDermott, "Analysis of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title II of the Dodd -Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act", SKADDEN COMMENTARY ON THE DODD-FRANK A CT , July
2010 at 1 (“Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, titled ‘Orderly Liquidation Authority,’ creates an entirely new
insolvency regime for large, interconnected financial companies, including broker-dealers, whose failure
poses a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.”).
6 See generally id.
7 See generally Report prepared by the Republican Staff of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House
of Representatives, Failing to End Too-Big-To-Fail: An Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years
Later, available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 The Bankruptcy Code And Financial Institution Insolvencies: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R._, 113th Cong. 13-14
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expectation of support by the government, institutions will be more aware of the risks they
are taking and are likely to borrow less. 12 The decrease in the use of borrowing leads to
less use of short-term funding and excessive leverage. Accordingly, this leads to a
reduced likelihood that a financial firm would need support in the first place.13
Despite the safeguards put in place by the Dodd-Frank Act, there remains the
argument that after witnessing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Bankruptcy Code,
as it reads today, is not an effective mechanism to resolve the failing of a systemically
important financial institution (“SIFI”).14 Even if the critics are correct about bankruptcy
law not being capable of providing resolution, the new Dodd-Frank regime makes clear
that the OLA is a last resort, not a first resort to the Bankruptcy Code. In a recent house
subcommittee discussion on financial institution resolution, Jeffrey Lacker, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Va., noted that both “Titles I and II of the DoddFrank Act ‘clearly’ envision bankruptcy without government support as the ’first and most
preferable option’ in the case of a failing financial institution.”15 Lacker argues that if
resolution in bankruptcy without government support becomes the norm, “the incentives
of market participants would be better aligned with our public policy goal of a financial
system that effectively allocates capital and risks.”16 As mentioned above, this leads to

(2013)[hereinafter 2013 House Hearing] (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker, President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond).
12 Id. (explaining that “the problem-widely known as “too-big-to-fail” consists of two mutually reinforcing
expectations”).
13 Id.
14 12 U.S.C. § 5464 (provid ing s tandards for systemically important financial market utilit ies and payment,
clearing, or settlement activities ); see also Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/systemicallyimportant-financial-institution-sifi.asp (“Any firm as designated by the U.S. Federal Reserve, whose
collapse would pose a serious risk to the econo my. Systematically impo rtant financial institutions became
the target of legislation and regulatory reform by the Obama Administration, due to issues concerning their
consolidated supervision and regulation, following the financial crisis of 2008.”).
15 Legislative Highlights; House Subcommittee Discusses Financial Institution Resolution Through the
Code, A M. BANKR. INST . L.J., Jan.2014, at 10, 68.
16 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker).
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large financial firms wanting to be “less leveraged and less reliant on unstable short-term
funding.”17 Hence, institutions and markets become resilient when faced with financial
stress, and policy makers could credibly renounce the commitment to rescue distressed
financial firms that potentially could disrupt the market place.18
With that in mind, this Comment examines how distressed financial firms can be
resolved through the bankruptcy process without drawing on emergency government
support, exemplified by the government bailout during the 2008 financial crisis. The
bankruptcy process has long been favored as the primary mechanism for dealing with
distressed and failing companies. Now has come the time that financial companies are
subjected to the bankruptcy process as well. Bankruptcy should be favored as the primary
mechanism for dealing with distressed and failing financial firms to deter reckless
corporate decisions made in the penumbra of the bailout safety net, in lieu of bailouts.
Applying bankruptcy principles such as impartiality, adherence to established precedent,
and due process to failing financial firms sets a necessary bright-line standard to hold
corporations fiscally responsible. However, the Bankruptcy Code is not without flaw,
enforcement of a uniform and predictable Bankruptcy Code is needed. The goals of this
Comment are to examine the current problems with the Bankruptcy Code, in particular,
issues arising with Chapter 11’s ability to reorganize a distressed financial firm and to
explore proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code by way of the Financial Institution
Bankruptcy Act of 2014 (“FIBA 2014”).

17
18

See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker).
See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker).
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Moreover, this Comment takes the position that the “single point of entry”
(SPOE)19 approach is the most viable and efficient method to resolve a distressed financial
institution that is organized with a holding company atop the corporate structure. Through
FIBA’s proposed amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, the SPOE approach can be put to
work through the bankruptcy process. Additionally, this Comment argues that the
proposed amendments allow the bankruptcy process to facilitate the orderly resolution of a
financial firm, while minimizing negative effects to the financial markets (so-called
systemic disruption), and protecting tax-payers from loss and maximizing value for
stakeholders. Finally, this Comment determines that a bankruptcy-style resolution, even
under a revised Bankruptcy Code could work without government funding; however, the
process should be safeguarded by having the government as a lender of last resort.
Accordingly, Part II discusses why bankruptcy (particularly Chapter 11) is the
preferred mechanism for resolution of systemically important financial firm. Part III
addresses the current problems with the Bankruptcy Code. Part IV will discuss the
proposed revisions made to the Bankruptcy Code by way of FIBA 2014. Part V considers
the remaining problems in the Bankruptcy Code. Part VI concludes this Comment.
II. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE PREFERENCE FOR BANKRUPTCY
State and federal government have always played a significant role in banking, and
is the main reason why the bankruptcy process has taken a secondary role to federal bank
regulators when it comes to handling their insolvency.20 With the passage of the DoddFrank Act, regulators maintain their position in banking, despite the fact that the
bankruptcy process has long been favored as the primary mechanism for dealing with
19

For a discussion on SPOE, see infra part IV.
See generally Kimberly Anne Summe, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LEHMAN BANKRUPT CY, in ENDING
BAILOUT S A S W E KNOW THEM 65–67 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., Hoover Institution Press 2010).
20
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distressed and failing companies.21 Bankruptcy is favored because of its impartiality,
adherence to established precedent, and the fact that it is grounded in the principles of due
process and rule of law.22 With the collapse of the financial sector in 2008, Congress had
the opportunity to limit the divide between banking and bankruptcy and create a more
unified system, but instead, pursuant to Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, it created a new
system for addressing financial distress. Despite a good faith attempt by Congress to
establish an efficient and orderly resolution regime, the legislation has left gaps between
bankruptcy resolution and the new federal resolution regime. But as this Comment will
discuss, proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code, by way of the FIBA 2014, allows for a
regime integration that could narrow the gaps and provide a more unified system of
resolution for a failing financial firm, which may account for both state and federal
interests. This Comment will first discuss why bankruptcy is the preferred mechanism for
resolution of a systemically important financial institution and why the Bankruptcy Code
must be revised to work in sync with the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that the use of bankruptcy, not the OLA, is the
preferred mechanism for resolution of SIFI.23 The OLA is only used in limited situations,
such as where bankruptcy is not a viable option because of the possible risks posed to the
U.S. financial market.24 The Dodd-Frank Act envisions bankruptcy as the preferred
mechanism in two key places. The first being in Title I, with the instituting of a resolution

21

Id.
Id.
23 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 82-3 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein, co-chair of the
Insolvency and Restructuring Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).
24 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP ., A DVISORY COMM . ON SYST EMIC RESOLUT ION: THE SINGLE POINT OF ENT RY
RESOLUT ION ST RATEGY (2013).
22
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plan, or so called “living will” under Section 165(d).25 Under Title I, covered financial
institutions are required to put forth a plan, subject to review by the Federal Reserve
Board, the Financial Stability oversight Council, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation that demonstrates how the financial institution will orderly resolve their
affairs “in the event of material financial distress or failure”26 under the Bankruptcy
Code.27 Essentially, because these resolution plans are tested in a bankruptcy proceeding,
bankruptcy is seen to be the preferred mechanism of choice for a failing financial firm.
Otherwise regulators would have required a financial firms plan to be tested under another
mechanism, such as the OLA.28 The fact that these resolution plans will be tested against
bankruptcy validates the inference that it is “critically important to the development of
credible resolution plans under Title I . . . that bankruptcy law is effective in its ability to
resolve SIFI’s.”29
The second point envisioning bankruptcy as the preferred resolution mechanism
can be seen in the context of government regulators’ ability to initiate the actual OLA
process.30 In order for Title II to be invoked, government regulators must find that
bankruptcy is wanting; therefore, “by its own terms, bankruptcy is designed by the DoddFrank Act to be the preferred resolution mechanism.”31 With the declaration of
bankruptcy as the presumptive procedure for resolution, comes the necessity to equip the
25

See generally Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R._, 113th Cong. 98 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 House Hearing] (statement of Thomas H. Jackson, Distinguished University Professor &
President Emeritus University of Rochester.)
26 12 U.S.C. §5301-165(d)(1) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5366 (d)(1) (2012).
27 See generally Jennifer Meyerowit z & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd- Frank Living Wills Pri mer: What You
Need to Know Now, A M. BANKR. INST . J., Aug. 2012, at 34. This looks correct to me according to rule 16.5
28 See 2014 House Hearing, supra note 25, at 99 (statement of Thomas H. Jackson).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.; see also Remarks by Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman,Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on
Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act before the Volker Alliance Program (Oct. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.fdic/gov/news/news/speeches/spoet1313.html.
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Bankruptcy Code with the proper tools so that it may accomplish the goals of minimizing
losses and placing them on appropriate, pre identified, parties; minimize systemic
consequences; and prevent a government bail-out.32 Moreover, these goals are in line with
the two goals of the Dodd-Frank Act: (1) limiting the risk of contemporary finance; and
(2) reducing the damage caused by the failure of a large financial institution. 33
A. Bankruptcy Is A Superior Resolution Mechanism.
The OLA of Title II is an inferior alternative to the well-established legal
landscape of bankruptcy for the simple reason that it “imbues the FDIC with unfettered
discretion to exercise its orderly liquidation authority.”34 Bankruptcy has an alreadydeveloped legal landscape and is administered by an impartial tribunal with clear rules in
place.35 Together, the clear rules administered by learned bankruptcy judges provide for
the application of a uniform resolution regime that allows financial institutions to properly
plan their “living will” under Title I in the event of an insolvency or financial crisis. 36
Despite the fact that the FDIC has announced that it supports the idea that
bankruptcy, not the OLA, should be the presumptive resolution procedure, an ongoing
debate still exists on whether the OLA is preferable to bankruptcy.37 Supporters of the
OLA argue that orderly liquidation is preferable to bankruptcy because bankruptcy
32

2014 House Hearing, supra note 25, at 99–100 (statement of Thomas H. Jackson).
See generally David Skeel, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERST ANDING THE DODD-FRANK A CT AND ITS
(UNINT ENDED) CONSEQUENCES (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011).
34 James H.M. Sprayregen & Stephen E. Hessler, Too Much Discretion To Succeed: Why A Modified
Bankruptcy Code Is Preferable To Title II Of the Dodd-Frank Act, FED. RES.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/June/20110607/OP-1418/OP
1418_053111_ 80002_ 310357154312_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 9th 2015, 4:19 PM) (Submission in response to
Federal Reserve Request for information relating to Dodd -Frank Act section 216 Study regarding the
resolution of financial companies under the bankruptcy code).
35 Id. at 2–4.
36 Id.
37 The Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R._, 113th Cong. 2nd Sess. 20–21 (2014)
[hereinafter FIBA Hearing] (statement of Donald S. Bernstein, co-chair of the Insolvency and Restructuring
Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).
33
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proceedings can be slow and may allow failing institutions to linger in Chapter 11, rather
than just being liquidated.38 Opponents of the OLA argue that two potential options for
dealing with resolution result in uncertainty and cause greater systemic risk. 39 What
seems to be even more problematic is the huge amount of discretionary power given to the
FDIC, which can essentially “pick winners and losers”40 in deciding which firms would be
liquidated.41 This type of vast discretion leaves certain creditors at the mercy of the FDIC
and can lead to fundamental unfairness. Moreover, creditor uncertainty on how a SIFI
would be resolved during a time of financial distress can lead to an overall decline in
investing and would create more confusion, which would further result in some form of
adverse systemic risk.42 Alternatively, bankruptcy has a proper foundation already in
place, and with certain provisions added to the Bankruptcy Code, the problems caused by
having multiple resolution mechanisms can be avoided. As stated by Congressman
Bachus,43 ranking member on the Financial Services Committee, “bankruptcy is open,
transparent, and has clear rules, precedents, and a judge, which ensures fairness. ”44
Contrarily, OLA procedure would be carried out “behind closed doors”45 and use
government funds as regulators see fit, further supporting the notion that SIFI’s must be
knowingly subjected to bankruptcy proceedings in the event of insolvency. 46

38

Jamieson L. Hardee, The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor's Perspective, 15 N.C. BANKING
INST . 259, 263 (2011).
39 Id.
40 Id.; see also 156 CONG. REC. H5223, 5226 (daily ed. June 30, 2010 ) (Statement of Rep. Garret).
41 Hardee, supra note 38, at 263.
42 Hardee, supra note 38, at 264.
43 Spencer Thomas Bachus III is a former U.S. Representative for the state of Alabama. He served from
1993–2015. He is a member of the Republican Party. As a member of the Republican Party, he served as
chairman of the House Financial Services Committee (2011–2013).
44 Id. (quoting156 CONG. REC. H4289, 4289 (daily ed. June 9, 2010) (statement of Rep. Bachus).
45 Id.
46 Id.
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Bankruptcy scholars such as Jeffery Lacker, argue that the bankruptcy process is
preferable because "the alternatives are worse" and require the discretionary use of federal
funds, which is an "unstable and unsustainable approach."47 In response to a question
about "too big to fail," Lacker said, “the combination of an enhanced Bankruptcy Code
and the living will process will give regulators confidence that should a large financial
institution experience distress, they will be able to resolve it through the bankruptcy
process without extraordinary government assistance.”

48

B. Title II and The Creation of The OLA Fail In Preventing Big Banks From
Believing They Are “Too-Big-to-Fail.”
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal quoted the FDIC’s vice Chairman,
Thomas Hoeing who stated, “my major worry is the perception that, since the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act, we have really become a much more sound and stable financial
system, I question that.”49 Mr. Hoeing’s concerns stem from the belief that big banks
remain risky and they benefit from the perception that the U.S. would rescue them in a
crisis.50 Despite the fact that Dodd-Frank makes taxpayer bailouts illegal, the banks and
policy makers choose not to believe what is on the paper.51 The reason is that the law
allows for temporary government support and sends a message that banks will remain
open for business in the face of insolvency, giving them an incentive to continue with
risky business models.52 In order to relinquish this ideology, banks must be forced by
regulators to put forth a proper “living will” that avoids taxpayer bailouts and has a
47

See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11 at 108 (statement of Jeffery Lacker in response to Rep. Jason
Smith question asking Lacker to explain the benefits of resolving financial firms through the bankruptcy
process).
48
Id. (“Once this process becomes the norm, it will also shift incentives in financial markets and lead to less
short-term funding, less maturity transformation, and less market fragility.”).
49 See Ryan Tracy, The Man Who Has Wall Street Banks on Edge, W ALL ST . J., Sept. 26, 2014, at C1-C4.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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credible path in bankruptcy.53 Therefore, in order to hinder financial firms from
continuing the operation of risky business models and to prevent these firms from
believing the Government will bail them out, distressed financial firms must be subjected
to the bankruptcy process.
Moreover, if firms are subjected to a bankruptcy process, it becomes very
important to properly equip the Bankruptcy Code with tools to necessary to facilitate the
resolution of a failing financial firm. If the Bankruptcy Code is left in its current state,
financial firms cannot adequately plan their “living will”’ and the possibility of the bailout
may still seem viable in the eyes of a financial firm. If the “living wills” are deemed
adequate by regulators, resolution of a firm should, in hindsight, be possible in
bankruptcy, which supports the perception that financial institutions can no longer assume
they will be put in receivership and bailed out by taxpayers. 54
Therefore, if these financial institutions know they will be subjected to bankruptcy
and because of their “living wills” understand how they are going to liquidate or be
reorganized, bankruptcy could theoretically damper a financial institution’s assumption
that they will be rescued in the event of a financial crisis. 55

53

Id.
Contra Abby McCloskey & Paul H. Kupiec, Why the ‘Living Will’ Process Sets Banks Up for Failure,
AM. BANKER (Aug. 11, 2014, (April 17, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/whythe-living-will-process-sets-banks-up-for-failure-1069285-1.ht ml (arguing that “living wills” allow
regulators to restructure and change companies).
55 The presumption of not being bailed out by the government also has to do with living wills being
developed with the assumption of guaranteed financing in bankruptcy, through the form of Debtor in
Possession funding. Many critics argue that this is unrealistic. See Gina Chon, Fed Blow to Banks over
“Living Wills,” FIN. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/617d442c -24c4-11e4ae78-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3NhofJlY8 (discussing that banks are precluded from
assuming funding through the discount window during a time of financial stress).
54
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More importantly, Title II’s purpose to prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts of major
financial institutions does not justify supplanting the Bankruptcy Code with the OLA. 56
Regulators point to the ad hoc bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as the impetus for the
enactment of the OLA pursuant to Title II. Regulators believe that if the Lehman Brothers
estate had been placed in OLA receivership, it would have “imposed a lesser disruption on
financial markets, and resulted in a greater recovery for Lehman’s creditors, than . . .
Lehman Brothers’ filing under chapter 11.”57 Not only is this highly unlikely, but also the
FDIC makes some peculiar criticisms to the Bankruptcy Code, stating that there are no
parallel provisions in the Bankruptcy Code to effectively facilitate a transfer of a financial
company’s assets, liabilities, and operations to “one or more bridge financial companies
for preservation of going concern, while less assets remain in receivership and are
liquidated.”58 A Section 363 sale,59 however, expressly authorizes the sale of property to
an estate (analogous to a bridge company), and we can look to the automotive bankruptcy
cases to see a very similar situation in the transfer of assets to a bridge company. 60
Further, if the goal of Title II is to liquidate failing companies, why is the FDIC
contemplating restructuring? Is that not why we have the Bankruptcy Code? It seems that
regulators, despite pronouncing bankruptcy as the resolution vehicle, are attempting yet
another power-grab in an effort to remain relevant in the world of bank insolvency. In
56

Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note 34, at 4.
Sprayregen & Hessler supra note 34, at 4.
58 Sprayregen & Hessler supra note 34, at 4.
59 “Section 363 refers to the portion of the Bankruptcy Code that authorizes a debtor to sell its assets ‘outside
the ordinary course of business.’” Case S. Weil, Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code – A Tool for Buying
and Selling Financially Distressed Assets, (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.lawmoss.com/content/uploads/2013/09/MBNews -2013-8-Section-363.pdf Sales of assets
“outside the ordinary course of business” are sales that are either unlike the sales that the debtor engages in
his ordinary course of business. Id. “A Section 363 sale transfers the debtor’s assets to a buyer in a discrete
transaction that will be approved by the bankruptcy court if the debtor can demonstrate a “substantial
business justification” for the sale.” Id.
60 See Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, A Comparative Study of Bankruptcy As Bailout, 6 BROOK.
J. CORP . FIN. & COM. L. 79, 81 (2011).
57
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addition, the FDIC points to the Bankruptcy Code’s inability to guarantee access to debtor
in possession (“DIP”)61 financing, contrary to Title II where the FDIC is permitted to
borrow funds from the Department of Treasury to make loans to, or guarantee, financial
company obligations.62 The FDIC position is that if the Bankruptcy Code cannot quickly
provide a funding source to a distressed SIFI, the delay in obtaining financing may
destabilize the market. Additionally, DIP financing usually takes time to obtain and
comes coupled with use restrictions from the lender. Typically these restrictions will
devalue a financial firm and further limit their option in reorganizing or liquidation.63 This
Comment does take the stance that federal funding will likely be needed to facilitate the
resolution of a SIFI, but it does not draw the conclusion that the OLA must be the
resolution tool in order to provide this type of funding. If the goal of Title II is to “prevent
bailouts, minimize moral hazard and market instability, . . . it is entirely counterintuitive
not to require that DIP financing be subject to reasonable limitations such as market
testing, creditor scrutiny, secured lender consent and conditions, the grant of additional
security interest, and court approval.”64 The existence of providing federal funding in
some form or another will continue to be an active debate, especially when contemplating
Upon a debtor filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition the debtor is now called the “debtor in possession”
and takes the role of a trustee in bankruptcy. Douglas J. Whaley & Jeffrey W. Morris, PROBLEMS AND
M AT ERIALS ON DEBT OR AND CREDITOR LAW 391 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business 2013); see also Marshall S. Huebner, Debtor-In-Possession Financing, THE RMA J., Apr. 2005, at
30, 31.
The DIP typically finds itself in need of credit immediately after initiating a Chapter 11
case. While most of its pre-bankruptcy liabilities are frozen, the company is likely to need
cash immediately to cover payroll and the up-front costs of stabilizing the business. DIP
loans are typically asset- based, revolving working-capital facilities put into place at the
out- set of Chapter 11 to provide both immediate cash as well as ongoing working capital
during the reorganization process. Perhaps most important, DIP financing helps the
company restore vendor and customer confidence in the company’s abilit y to maintain its
liquidity. Id. when block-quoting, you don’t need quotation marks
62 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note34, at 5–6.
63 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note 34, at 5–6; see FDIC QUART ERLY, THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION OF
LEHMAN BROT HERS HOLDINGS INC. UNDER T HE DODD-FRANK A CT 31– 49 (2011)
64 Sprayregen & Hessler, supra note34, at 6.
61
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the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon. But when taking a step back from the debate, this
Comment argues that a revised Bankruptcy Code can facilitate the resolution of a SIFI
without government funding but may be more effective if federal funding is in place as a
last resort. Regardless, whether the funding is deemed necessary or not for resolution of a
SIFI, the arguments above demonstrate the preference for bankruptcy and the unnecessary
enactment of the OLA. As validated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, problems do
exist with the ability of the bankruptcy process to handle resolution of a SIFI, which will
be explored below. But by revising the Bankruptcy Code, the possibility of a government
bailout is limited and financial firms that become distressed will have a properly
formulated plan to be facilitated in bankruptcy.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CODE
“One of the most important questions facing policymakers today is whether the
bankruptcy process is, or with modifications could be, a suitable method for handling the
failure of complex financial firms.”65 As suggested above, this Comment proposes that
the Bankruptcy Code, as left by the Dodd-Frank Act to be the default mechanism, needs to
be revised to accommodate these complex financial institutions and accomplish its
presumptive goal of providing orderly resolution. This section of the Comment explores
why the Bankruptcy Code needs to be revised in the light of its use during the 2008
bankruptcy of Lehman brothers. Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008. Their filing became the largest and notably most complex filing in
history, mainly because of its 209 subsidiaries in 21 different countries.66 “The experience

65

Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, How Well Does Bankruptcy Work When Large Financial
Firms Fail? Some Lessons from Lehman Brothers, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www2.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011/2011 -23.cfm.
66 Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail- In? And How!, 20 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., March, 2014 at 1–3.
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of resolving Lehman Brothers in the bankruptcy courts has since led to an active debate
regarding the effectiveness of U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings for complex financial
institutions.”67 Many critics of the bankruptcy process believe today’s distressed financial
institutions would face the same problems as Lehman Brothers in bankruptcy, but are
subsequently even more complex and involve multiple facets of business.68 For example,
the remaining large financial institutions involve investment banking, commercial
banking, and insurance underwriting.69 These financial institutions involved in the
commercial banking world (which Lehman Brothers was not involved in) are capable of
posing far greater risks to the financial system and to the economy, mainly because these
brick-and-mortar establishments are integrated into the “real economy.”70 Commentators
argue that bankruptcy is ineffective for resolution of SIFIs for a number of reasons,
starting with the length of the actual bankruptcy proceeding. 71 It has been argued that the
bankruptcy process takes too long and the lack of speed in bankruptcy prevents the
preservation of value and the uncertainty about the potential duration of the automatic stay
can further dissipate the value of assets. 72
A. Qualified Financial Contracts Exemption to Automatic Stay
The key feature to a bankruptcy proceeding is the automatic stay. This feature
“prohibits creditors from taking steps to collect what they are owed once a debtor has filed
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Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B Of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485, 487–88
(2012).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See generally id.
72 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ST UDY OF THE RESOLUT ION OF FINANCIAL COMPANIES
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a bankruptcy petition.”73 In effect, the stay halts the “race of diligence”74 by creditors that
might otherwise lead to haphazard liquidation of the firm’s assets, and instead allows for a
more coordinated resolution of the firm’s financial distress.75 Since the current
Bankruptcy Code was enacted, Congress has gradually expanded exemptions for
derivatives, repurchase agreements (“repos”)76 , and other “qualified financial”77 contracts
(QFCs).78 Therefore, investors who are holding QFCs have the ability to immediately
terminate and net-out their contracts or liquidate the collateral on their claims once a party
has defaulted or filed for bankruptcy.79 The problem is that these financial contracts are
the primary assets of financial institutions, and the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor
provisions permit a “run” on these assets. 80 To use Lehman Brothers as an example: when
they filed for bankruptcy, QFC’s were exempted from the automatic stay, preference
provisions, and the bankruptcy “anti-ipso” facto clause rules.81 This in turn caused the
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David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 158 (2012).
74 Race of diligence: this means that the first to perfect or to turn an inchoate into a choate lien wins. This
generally must be done item by item because there is no general levy power. A secured creditor will win
over an unsecured one. The first to record a judgment usually has the right to the good. Cite the source here
as string.
75 See Skeel, supra note 73, at 158.
76 A repurchase agreement is a form of “short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities. The
dealer sells the government securities to investors, usually on an overnight basis, and buys them back the
following day.” INVEST OPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/repurchaseagreement.asp
77 See Pellerin & Walter, infra note 91, at 19 note. 27 (“In the Bankruptcy Code, contracts exempt from the
automatic stay are referred to as ‘safe harbor contracts’ . . .The federal Depository institution act and the
Dodd-Frank Act refer to the safe harbor contracts as QFCs. Since safe harbor contracts and QFCs generally
refer to the same types of contracts, we will use the term QFC to refer to both, which is consistent with
industry practice.”).
78 Skeel, supra note 73, at 158.
79 See Hardee, supra note 38, at 278.
80
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 72, at 7.
81 “The phrase ipso facto is Latin for ‘by the fact itself.’ Ipso facto clauses are sometimes included in lease
and purchase contracts, and they assert that if the lessee or purchaser becomes insolvent, or files for
bankruptcy protection, then the contract has been breached. In other words, under such a clause the very act
of filing for bankruptcy protection constitutes a breach of contract (hence the appellation, ipso facto clause)
that absolves the other party of any further contract obligations .” Nicholas Gebelt, Southern California
Bankruptcy Law Blog, available at http://www.southerncaliforniabankruptcylawblog.com/2012/11/19/ipsofacto-clauses-in-bankruptcy/.
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‘spreads’ on credit default contracts (“CDS”)82 insuring Lehman Brothers’ debt to be seen
as minimal instead of large (as default risks rise so does the spread).83 Therefore, if the
market recognized the CDS spread as large, market participants would have known
Lehman Brothers was at the brink of insolvency. Because of the QFC’s exemption from
the automatic stay, the market did not interpret Lehman Brothers as being at the threshold
of default or insolvency until immediately before its collapse.84 Additionally, the belief by
CDS protection sellers that they would be bailed out if Lehman Brothers collapsed kept
the price of CDSs low and therefore, the market saw Lehman Brothers as being in good
financial health. Moreover, the special protections for derivatives added to this distortion
and amplified the losses Lehman Brothers unexpected collapse caused in two ways. 85
First, bankruptcy’s special treatment of repurchase agreements invited a form of
accounting manipulation used by Lehman Brothersat the end of each quarter to disguise
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Stephano Giglio, Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial Risk , Harvard University, Job
Market Paper (Jan. 2011)
Credit default swaps are credit derivatives that allow the trans fer of the credit risk of a
firm between two agents for a predetermined amount of time. In a typical CDS contract,
the protection seller offers the protection buyer insurance against the default of an
underlying bond issued by a certain company (the reference entity). In the event of
default by the reference entity, the seller commits to buy the bond for a price equal to its
face value from the protection buyer. In exchange for the insurance, the buyer pays a
quarterly premium, called the CDS spread, quoted as an annualized percentage of the
notional value insured. If default occurs, the contract terminates, and the quarterly
payments are interrupted. If default does not occur during the life of the contract, the
contract terminates at its maturity date. A credit default swap is an insurance contract
against the default of a firm, for example a financial institution. The ‘CDS’ spread
corresponds to the yearly insurance premium.
83 Vincent Ryan, Do CDS Spreads Tell the Truth?, CFO (Mar. 19, 2011), http://ww2.cfo.com/bankingcapital-markets/2011/05/do-cds-spreads-tell-the-truth-2/.
84 Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 A M. BANKR. L.J. 123, 123–131 (2010)
(noting that a credit default swap (CDS) provides the buyer with a p ayout if some underlying debt issued by
the “referenced entity” defaults and that the value of the CDS is entirely dependent on the properties of the
underlying reference obligations); see e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter
11, 81 A M. BANKR. L.J. 405, 410–11 (2007); Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the
next Transformation of Sovereign Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 169 (2008)); see also Skeel, supra note
73, at 164–65; John B. Taylor, DEFINING SYST EMIC RISK OPERAT IONALLY, in ENDING GOVERNMENT
BAILOUT S A S W E KNOW THEM, 46 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., 2010)(arguing bankruptcy causes runs on
repurchase agreements and fire sales of collateral underlying closed-out derivatives).
85 Id.
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the amount of its leverage. These transactions, now known as “105 transactions”86 are
ordinarily characterized as financing for accounting purposes. However, since these
secured transactions are exempt from bankruptcy law, Lehman Brothers was able to
characterize these repurchase agreement transactions as sales and shave millions in debt
from their balance sheets. This recharacterization followed a delay in the recognition of
Lehman Brothers’ true financial condition and as stated by David Skeel,87 “almost
certainly magnified the costs of its failure.”88
The second contribution, by way of the derivatives exclusion to Lehman’s losses,
can be seen by J.P. Morgan’s ability to seize and sell Lehman’s assets right before
Lehman folded.89 Lehman Brothers owed J.P. Morgan twenty billion dollars before they
filed for bankruptcy and because derivative contracts are exempted from bankruptcy’s
automatic stay provision, Lehman Brothers could not prevent J.P. Morgan from seizing
and selling Lehman assets in lieu of the twenty billion.90 Creditors who are able to rush in
and seize assets are likely to grab assets, which are fundamental to the firm’s continued
operations, so called “going-concern assets.”91 Going concern assets are important to a

See generally Michael J. De La Merced & Julia Werdigier, The Origins of Lehman’s ‘Repo 105,’
(March 12, 2010 7:02 a.m.) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/the-brit ish-origins-of-leh mansaccounting-gimmick/?_r=0 (“Repo 105 transactions were worth 105 percent of the cash it received ”); See
also INVEST OPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/repo-105.asp (“An accounting trick in which a
company classifies a short-term loan as a sale and subsequently uses the cash proceeds from said sale to
reduce its liabilities. In the repo market, companies are able to gain access to the excess funds of other firms
for short periods in exchange for collateral usually a bond ”).
87 David Skeel is the author of The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its
(Unintended) Consequences (Wiley, 2011), as well as numerous articles and other publications. He has been
interviewed on The News Hour, Nightline, Chris Matthews’ Hardball (MSNBC), National Public Radio, and
Marketplace, among others, and has been quoted in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington
Post and other newspapers and magazines.
88 David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 165 (2012).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See Sabrina R. Pellerin & John R. Walter, Orderly Liquidation Authority as an Alternative to Bankruptcy,
98 ECON. 1, 3–4 (2012); LAW LIB- A M. LAW AND LEGAL INFO, http://law.jrank.org/pages/7169/Going86
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firm that might be successfully reorganized. Such assets include operating equipment or
property essential to the firms operations. Furthermore, assets sold off separately are
almost never worth more than if bundled together with other assets. This causes a
reduction in the total amount creditors receive if the firm is liquidated and can prevent a
firm from reorganization because of the asset seizures.92 Despite the possibility to receive
more if assets are kept intact and bundled, creditors not subject to the automatic stay are
individually incentivized to be the first to grab assets in an effort to recover a higher
proportion of their debts than creditors who are slow to react. The counterargument to
permitting the expansive protection for derivatives and repurchase agreements is to
achieve the intended goal of “minimizing the systemic risks potentially arising from
certain interrelated financial activities and markets.”93

Concern-Value.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015); see also W EST ’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF A MERICAN LAW ,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437701998.ht ml.
Going Concern value is the value inherent in an active, established company as opposed
to a firm that is not yet established. As a component of business value, going concern
value recognizes the many advantages that an existing business has over a new business,
such as avoidance of start-up costs and improved operating efficiency. In this sense, the
going concern value of a firm represents the difference between the value of an
established firm and the value of a start-up firm. Going concern value also indicates the
value of a firm as an operating, active whole, rather than merely as distinct items of
property. U.S. Bankruptcy law, for example, has recognized the need to preserve going
concern value when reorganizing businesses in order to maximize recoveries by creditors
and shareholders (11 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.). Bankruptcy laws seek to preserve going
concern value whenever possible by promoting the reorganization, as opposed to the
liquidation, of businesses. WAS THE EMPHASIS ON “COMPONENT” IN THE
ORIGINAL OR IS IT ADDED?
92 Contra Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 3 (noting that QFCs can be immediately closed out because
the collateral backing them will naturally not be complementary to other assets of the firm, nor will QFC
collateral be vital to the firm’s going-concern value. Such as exceedingly marketable or cash securities,
which can be eliminated without undercutting the firm’s ability to create loans or other financial products.
Refuting this argument is that security backing some QFCs are firm specific and not all QFCs should be
treated evenly).
93 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 22 (citing Douglas H, Jones, Senior Deputy General Counsel, FDIC,
Statement on Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, United States Senate (Mar. 25, 1999); see also Soo J. Yim &
William J. Perlstein, “The Effect of Proposed Amendments to U.S Insolvency and Banking Laws on
Transactions Involving Securities, Commodities and Other Financial Contracts, 3” Prepared in connection
with the American Bar Association 2001 spring meeting section of business law business bankruptcy
committee forum on derivatives and proposed financial contract netting legislation (March 24, 2001)
(“Immediate termination of outstanding contracts and liquidation of collateral facilities the acquisition of
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Conversely, the idea of preventing systemic risk by allowing the safe harbor
provision to apply to QFCs, did not prove accurate during the financial crisis. This is
because, despite one form of systemic risk being reduced, the exemption promotes another
form of systemic risk by allowing runs on repos94 and fire sales95 of the collateral
underlying closed-out derivative contracts.96 Again, in order to demonstrate the effects
the exemption had on financial firms and the market, this Comment looks to the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. On the day of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing,
733,000 of their 930,000 derivative counterparties sought to terminate their contracts.97
This rush to close out positions and demand collateral added to the already-failing and
weakened Lehman Brothers, while causing a negative effect on the financial market as
parties rushed to sell their Lehman Brother shares and buy new positions with
counterparties.98 Bankruptcy scholar Stephen J. Lubben99 argues that the 2005
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code broadened the scope of “repurchase agreements” by
including mortgage loans and interests in mortgage loans.100 This in effect facilitated the
already substantial use of short-term repo financing and contributed to the losses by
encouraging excessive lending to mortgage originators. 101 These arguments demonstrate

replacement contracts, reduces uncertainty and uncontrollable risk, improves liquidity and reduces the risk
of rapid devaluation of collateral in volatile markets”).
94 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23 n.39 (defining “runs on repos” as a situation where counterparties seize
the collateral underlying these deposit-like instruments).
95 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23 n.40 (noting that the “phrase ‘fire sale’ typically refers to the possibility
that the sale of an asset might yield a lower-than-typical price if holders of one type of asset attempt to sell
en masse”). In comparison, the ‘typical’ (non-fire) price will result if sales are distributed over time. Id.
96 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23 (citing Edwards and Morrison 2005, Taylor 2010, Archarya et al. 2011).
97 See Sabrina supra note 91, at 23.
98 See Lubben, supra note 84, at 130–32.
99 Stephen J. Lubben is the holder of the Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance &
Business Ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law and is an expert in the field of corporate finance and
governance, corporate restructuring, financial distress , and debt. He is also the In Debt columnist for the
New York Times' Dealbook page.
100 See Lubben, supra note 84, at 130–32.
101 See Lubben, supra note 84, at 138–40.
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that bankruptcy’s special QFC treatment, as applied to SIFI’s in financial distress, would
not be ideal and a change is warranted in order to allow bankruptcy to be the proper
mechanism for resolution.
B. Bankruptcy’s Limited Sources of Funding.
Another problem with bankruptcy, as it currently exists, is its limited capability of
providing adequate funding to a financial firm who is attempting to reorganize in Chapter
11. A firm attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy can obtain funds from a dismal array of
sources, one consisting of the firm’s very own assets or in the case of reorganization,
potential debtor in possession (“DIP”)102 financing.103 Obtaining DIP financing is
essential to the successful reorganization of a firm since it allows debtors to maintain
sufficient liquidity to operate while reorganizing in Chapter 11. However, when faced
with a financial crisis, funding must become available quickly in order to successfully
reorganize.104 This may be a difficult task for financial firms because of their inherent line
of business. Assets of financial firms are usually highly obscure to outsiders and without
careful analyses are very difficult to value. 105 As a result, DIP loans, which rely on the
free market, may be very difficult to obtain in a time of financial distress. 106 “Section 364
of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a post-petition creditor to receive priority in the
distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate superior to all other creditors of the
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For an explanation of debtor in possession financing see supra note 61..
See Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 13–14 (In reorganization, the distressed corporation, the debtor,
continues to manage, or own, the troubled entity. Any loans to the distressed corporation are therefore loans
to the DIP. Id. “Such loans are often senior to all former-prior to the bankruptcy filing-debts of the bankrupt
firm. The prospect of being senior to other creditors allows funding to flow as long as creditors can be
convinced that the firm is likely to survive and therefore repay”). Id.
104 Pellerin & Walter, supra note 91, at 15.
105 Pellerin & Walter,supra note 91, at 15.
106
See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 83–85 (statement of Stephen J. Lubben, Harvey Washington Wiley
Chair in Corporate Goverance & Business Ethics Seton Hall University School of Law).
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estate… in order to make it possible to obtain funding.” 107 Regardless, if financial
conditions do not allow the financial firm to obtain funding, there is no provision in the
Bankruptcy Code authorizing the government to extend credit on this special preference
basis; however, the U.S. and Canadian governments did fill the void when Chrysler and
GM (collectively “GM”) were unable to obtain DIP financing. 108 The financial firm is
then faced with the dilemma of liquidating or obtaining government monetary support.
Some critics would say that any support from the government is a bailout and undermines
the entire bankruptcy process, regardless of how and why regulators say it is not.109 This
Comment does not take a position as to whether any form of federal funding is a bailout,
but it does take the position that some form of government funding as a backstop is
necessary when facilitating the orderly resolution of a SIFI, even when deploying a bail-in
strategy such as the SPOE, as discussed below.110 A major problem with bankruptcy is
that, when dealing with a SIFI, it is simply unrealistic to count on free market DIP
financing during a financial crisis. The use of Chapter 11 to reorganize GM demonstrates
an effective way for the bankruptcy system to facilitate government funding to a financial
firm without undermining the bankruptcy system itself. Conclusively, it is argued that the
Bankruptcy Code should explicitly permit the government the capability of extending
credit to a financial firm during times when DIP financing is unobtainable. 111,
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110 See discussion infra Part IV.
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Fail’ is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013) (noting that a firm who properly manages liquidity in normal
108

22

But as the Bankruptcy Code stands, without revisions, the limited sources of
funding available to a financial firm during reorganization lends to the belief that systemic
effects may still occur. If a financial firm does not have access to secured liquidity after
its recapitalization, it shortchanges the objectives and goals of recapitalization in the first
place. Sure, bankruptcy would still be fine to let firms fail as Lehman Brothers did, but if
the objective is to reorganize, some form of a lender of last resort need be in place. 112
C. Bankruptcy’s Domestic and Global Disruption
Financial institutions comparable in size to Lehman Brothers have an extensive
domestic and global reach. Therefore, some of the most disastrous consequences of such
an institutions failure occur outside the United States. In the case of Lehman Brothers,
several Asian and London based subsidiaries failed, in part due to immediate loss of
access to funds in Lehman Brothers management system.113 The worldwide effect of
Lehman Brothers default confirmed the need for a resolution strategy that considered
worldwide effects of financial institution distress. 114 In spite of these worldwide systemic
effects, Dodd-Frank did not address international consequences of a SIFI’s collapse and
neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the OLA are equipped to properly deal with worldwide
systemic effects.115 Seemingly, regulators have suggested that SIFI’s consider the effects
their financial distress may have on foreign entities when putting forth their living will or
resolution plan, but if these plans are tested against the Bankruptcy Code it becomes even

times prior to experiencing financial distress should be able line up funding without the support of
government-provided DIP financing).
112 See FIBA Hearing, supra note 37, at 33.
113 David A. Skeel, Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, FACULT Y SCHOLARSHIP PAPER
949, 6 (2014), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/949.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 9.
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more evident that the bankruptcy process must be able to resolve or hinder the worldwide
effects of a distressed SIFI.116
As will be discussed below, if the SPOE approach works as intended, it will
insulate foreign subsidiaries from a default by the parent company and limit the negative
effects outside of the United States.117
D. Hybrid Approaches: The Call for Uniformity
A major concern when resolving SIFIs is the possible subjection to a barrage of
insolvency regimes, both in the United States and in other countries. 118 Undoubtedly, the
involvement of multiple insolvency regimes complicated the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, and will continue to plague the resolution of SIFIs, if uncertainty exists on
which resolution regime will be employed during a time of financial distress.119 Title I
requires SIFIs to put forth a “living will” that will be tested under bankruptcy; a
subsidiary, however, may be subject to another resolution regime.120 As a result,
resolution plans tend to adopt a hybrid approach in which some entities may be
recapitalized or sold while others are wound-down.121 Advocates such as Donald
Bernstein argue that “[t]he simplest way to avoid competing resolution proceedings would
be to have a clear path to a single point of entry approach to financial firm insolvencies
under the Bankruptcy Code.”122 This would avoid hybrid approaches, which cause higher
implementation risk and the probability of larger losses for creditors and shareholders than
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See infra pp. 25–26.
118 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).
119 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).
120 Thomas H. Jackson, Resolving Financial Institutions: A Proposed Bankruptcy Code Alternative,
BANKING PERSPECT IVE , Q. 1 2014, at 22, 24.
121 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).
122 See 2013 House Hearing, supra note 11, at 84 (statement of Donald S. Bernstein); See discussion on
SPOE infra Part IV.
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a pure SPOE approach.123 Accordingly, as will be discussed supra, reforms that add tools
to facilitate a SPOE approach to resolution in bankruptcy can eliminate many of these
problems.
IV. THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 2014
FIBA 2014 is proposed legislation that amends the Bankruptcy Code by inserting
tools which will allow it to facilitate a whole-firm recapitalization approach to resolving
SIFIs. Particularly, the bill creates Subchapter V of Chapter 11, under which the assets of
a financially troubled institution would be transferred to a bridge company, while its stock
and long-term unsecured debt would be left behind in the old institution. The SIFI’s
property becomes the property of the newly-formed bridge company and ceases to be the
property of the bankruptcy estate.124 Supporters of the bill argue that whole-firm
recapitalization (SPOE approach), as a means of resolving SIFI’s, is by far the best
approach without taxpayer-funded bailouts.125 The SPOE approach to resolution is
designed to avoid the abrupt unraveling of a financial firm and provide an efficient means
to quickly disperse a distressed financial firm’s losses on to shareholders and creditors so
that “valuable components of the firm can continue business under new ownership and
management, or be wound down in an orderly manner as going concerns.”126
Additionally, the primary purpose of the SPOE approach under FIBA 2014 “is to
engender sufficient liquidity for the bridge financial company, to obtain private-sector
financing by creating a ‘clean’ balance sheet through the transfer to it of assets stripped of
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liabilities against which it can then borrow from the private sector.”127 Therefore, the
bill’s proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code allow for resolution of a SIFI in a
manner that: 1) allocates losses among proper parties; 2) maximizes value for
stakeholders; 3) minimizes systemic disruption and moral hazard; and yet 4) protects
taxpayers from loss.128 Most importantly, if bankruptcy is now capable of resolution,
these enhanced bankruptcy procedures allegedly "create a level playing field between
Wall Street and Main Street and … assure [that] all parties know the rules of the game
ahead of time."129 That said, Part IV of this Comment begins by describing the SPOE
approach as implemented through bankruptcy and then analyzes its application to describe
how it accomplishes the aforementioned goals.
A. The Bail-in, Not Bail-out Strategy
The single most important feature of the SPOE strategy is the source of the
funding.130 During the 2008 financial crisis, failing SIFI’s were rescued by funds outside
the institution in the “form of taxpayer assistance via a direct intervention by the sovereign
government,” hence a bailout.131 Conversely, the SPOE approach allows for funds to
come from within the institution, particularly in the form of subordinate debt, henceforth a
bail-in.132 The SPOE strategy is made possible by the structure of large U.S. financial
institutions. These institutions have a “top-level holding company whose capital structure
includes substantial amounts of bonds and other long-term unsecured debt but relatively
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few derivatives and other short term debt.”133 With less short-term debt and derivative
contracts, holding companies are much less susceptible to a run on their assets. This is
because assets at the holding company level, such as bonds, even if sold by their holders,
do not extract liquidity from the financial institution, making the holding company
structure a great candidate for the SPOE approach. 134 The holding company structure was
established by large US financial institutions because of restrictions put on a bank’s ability
to branch across state lines and hurdle other preventative regulations in the banking
industry. It is merely a pleasant surprise that these financial structures designed to avoid
regulation, allow for the implementation of the SPOE strategy. 135

With the holding

company structure in place, resolution involves proceedings only at the parent holding
company level and allows all operating subsidiaries to remain open for business. 136 The
operating subsidiaries would then be recapitalized with assets from the holding company
and would continue operation as part of a newly created debt-free bridge holding
company.137 Furthermore, by only placing the old holding company into resolution
proceedings and not its subsidiaries, systemic effects are limited because critical
subsidiaries are kept out of resolution and are provided with liquidity from the new
holding company.138

More importantly, with the establishment of a new bridge company,

the old holding companies creditors and shareholders are left behind to bear the losses in
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bankruptcy.139

Under the new SPOE approach, bankruptcy now has the tools to: “(1)

create and transfer the failed holding company’s assets to a bridge financial company; (2)
impose a temporary stay on financial contract terminations and a temporary override or
cross-defaults; (3) the ability to assume financial contracts and related guarantees; and (4)
the availability of temporary secured liquidity. ”140

Is there now a workable alternative to

the OLA and does Subchapter V provide superior protection against another financial
crisis; have we ended “too-big-to-fail”? These questions are not yet answered and it
remains unlikely they become answered until the SPOE strategy is tested in the
marketplace. Conversely, what is answered by amending the Bankruptcy Code is that
there now exists a workable alternative to the OLA and the Bankruptcy Code is capable of
providing resolution to troubled financial firms or SIFI’s. The following subparts will
explore how resolution proceedings are commenced and undergone via the new
Subchapter V.
1. Tri-party balancing act, consideration of debtors, creditors and governmental
aims when commencing Subchapter V proceedings.
Under Subchapter V, proceedings with respect to a “covered financial
institution”141 can commence either voluntarily by the distressed firm or involuntarily by
the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”).142 Subchapter V takes a middle ground position by
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adopting a two-scenario approach to commencing proceedings.143

Subchapter V

ultimately does not give all the power to the FRB nor leaves it solely in the hands of the
financial firm when contemplating relief in bankruptcy. In a conventional bankruptcy
case, only the debtor (voluntarily) or its creditors (involuntary) are able to commence
proceedings for the purpose of enforcing their own respective rights and obligations. 144
Contrarily, under Title II, proceedings to be put into OLA receivership are involuntarily
initiated by the federal government for the main purposes of preventing a financial crisis
and another taxpayer bailout, as in 2008.145 Subchapter V, as stated above, may
commence by the debtor or the FRB for purposes of reorganizing the failing firm and
preventing harm to market stability. 146 Therefore, this approach increases the likelihood
that the aim of creditors (maximizing their return), debtors (reorganizing the distressed
firm), and the government (preventing market contagion) are achieved when commencing
proceedings.147 Decisively, this minor but important revision to commencing proceedings
encourages financial corporations to pursue restructuring options and limits the
government’s discretionary power to involuntarily invoke proceedings148 by subjecting
them to the Bankruptcy Court for determination that their decision “shown by a
preponderance of the evidence is necessary to prevent imminent substantial harm to
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financial stability in the United States.”149 The next subpart will address the proposed
treatment of QFC’s under Subchapter V.
B. The Automatic Stay as Applied to Qualified Financial Contract s
As previously stated, the treatment of qualified financial contracts in bankruptcy
and its application to Lehman Brothers caused chaos and major disruption in the market
place.150 Consequently, Subchapter V helps to limit some of that disruption by subjecting
QFC’s to the automatic stay, even if for only forty-eight hours. First, in order to facilitate
the transfer of any derivatives and short-term debt to the newly created bridge entity,
§1188 of the bill permits a stay of forty-eight hours from the commencement of
proceedings on qualified financial contracts. 151 The stay halts a ‘run’ by the institutions
derivative counterparties long enough to facilitate the transfer to the newly created bridge
holding company.152 Furthermore, the stay is essential to successfully make the transfer of
assets to the bridge company. This is because without the stay there would unlikely be
any assets left by creditors to transfer to the bridge company. Additionally, the proposed
legislation addresses the issue of QFC location. Most of financial firms QFC’s are in the
operating subsidiaries of the holding company. Consequently, one of the most important
provisions of the bill is bankruptcy’s ability to override cross-defaults in QFC’s pursuant
to §1188(f). Cross-default provisions are contracts that have been entered into by the
debtor’s affiliates or subsidiaries that “make the debtor’s bankruptcy a default under the
affiliate contract,” hence the ability of the counterparty to now terminate the contract, in
which they are then capable of making a run at the firms going concern assets essential to
149
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the operation of vital subsidiaries.153

Section 1188(f) limits these counterparty

termination rights crucial to the SPOE recapitalization. 154 As stated by Donald Bernstein
before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and Antitrust Law:
“Overriding cross-defaults in QFCs of affiliates of a covered financial
corporation is crucial to a single point of entry recapitalization because
affiliate QFCs are often guaranteed by the holding company and, if the
holding company files for bankruptcy or loses its credit rating, termination
rights may be triggered, even though the affiliate counterparty is healthy,
well capitalized (having been recapitalized) and has not been placed into
bankruptcy proceedings or receivership. These cross-defaults to the holding
company’s bankruptcy or downgrades accordingly need to be overridden
by the statute if the external counterparty’s termination rights are to be
eliminated.155
Therefore, enabling the automatic stay to incorporate QFC’s and override the safe
harbor provisions, bankruptcy is able to limit some of the systemic effects caused
by a run on assets, provide liquidity to the new bridge company, and preserve a
distressed financial firms books.
C. International Standard for the Resolution of Global SIFI’s
The United States and the United Kingdom have heavily interconnected
markets, and the U.K. possesses the highest counterparty credit exposure of the
largest U.S. financial firms.156 Therefore, through a cooperative SPOE or bail-in
strategy for both party’s systemic banks, resolution proceedings for host country
operations are unnecessary.157 The key to both the U.S. and the U.K. believing in
the SPOE strategy as their preference “is the fact that recapitalization and bail-in
strategies allow the firms to continue their business and meet their operating
153
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obligations in the ordinary course in both home and host countries. As a result,
local regulators should not feel compelled to take precipitous actions that can
hinder the resolution of the overall group.”158 Irrefutably, because Subchapter V
of the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014 employs a SPOE strategy, the
bill brings us closer to solving global disruption of failing systemically important
financial institutions.
V.

THE REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Resolution of a SIFI should be done in a manner that maximizes value for
stakeholders, minimizes systemic disruption and moral hazard, and protects taxpayers
from loss.159 The proposal of a bail-in strategy through the addition of a Subchapter V to
the Bankruptcy Code does further these aims. Unfortunately, issues still exist that need to
be addressed if the Bankruptcy Code is going to successfully create a uniform regime to
resolve distressed financial firms.
A. The Liquidity Shortfall
The most glaring concern when implementing the SPOE approach through the
Bankruptcy Code is its failure to address the problem of obtaining “new” capital for
liquidity purposes.160 Access to liquidity is essential because without it, “regulators and
the market will lack the confidence needed to preserve at least a minimal sense of calm
without which all parties—regulators, counterparties and other market participants- will
race to seize assets and withdraw liquidity at all levels of the SIFI.”161 Therefore, in order
to accomplish a stabilization of the marketplace and the restructuring of a financial
158
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institution, immediate liquidity is needed. New liquidity does not consist of the
transferred assets to the bridge company as explained earlier, but must be obtained from
another source, such as in the form of DIP loans. The problem rests with obtaining DIP
funding during a time of financial distress; this may be difficult and time consuming,
which is not ideal for the resolution of a SIFI. Even under the best of circumstances, the
market will need to divulge the information about the restructuring of the financial firm
before market participants will begin to extend credit. More broadly, any delay in time
waiting for market liquidity to return can be detrimental to the successful restructuring of
the financial institution. As argued by bankruptcy scholar Stephen J. Lubben:
Successful recapitalization is going to depend on the va lue of the
enterprise. That value will be largely a function of the value of the SIFI’s
subsidiaries, perhaps with a little premium that reflects the synergies of
having all those subsidiaries working together under a single roof. If that
value is no longer sufficient to support the capital the financial institution
needs, there remains a major problem. Either losses will have to be
imposed at the subsidiary level to cut down the size or the FDIC will
simply have to inject value into the institution. 162
If the FDIC does provide liquidity to the institution we are left with the question of “is this
another bailout?” In short, if the FDIC uses taxpayer funds to prevent the liquidation of a
financial company, many opponents of reforming the Code will be in uproar. The truth is
that some mechanism must be in place to provide for an additional source of backstop
liquidity to prevent flight of short-term capital and stabilize the institution, particularly if
there is a risk of contagion.163 After a financial firm is recapitalized through the SPOE
approach it defeats the entire purpose to not provide sufficient liquidity in the event the
firm needs it to fend off a liquidity run. 164 This is extremely important especially when it
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comes to SIFIs. Distressed banks have had access to funding through the discount
window during times of financial distress in order to prevent or fund a run on their assets
and diversified financial institutions with broker dealers, insurers, and other operating
subsidiaries must have access to credit support other than through the public markets to do
the same.
Donald Bernstein, co-chair of the Insolvency and Restructuring Group at Davis
Polk & Wardwell LLP says, “after three-and-a-half decades of experience working with
troubled companies, that the simple availability of a committed liquidity source is the best
way to assure that the liquidity source is not needed.”165 Furthermore, to subvert the toobig-to-fail and bail-out arguments, the liquidity provided would not be risk capital.166 It
would be provided to healthy firms on a secured basis in order to protect taxpayers from
loss.167 With the development of the SPOE mechanism and the safeguards put in place to
protect taxpayers, now, in this post financial crisis world is the time for bankruptcy law to
reconcile illiquidity problems caused by creditor-runs.168 If bankruptcy law can
sufficiently address this glaring problem posed by distress SIFI’s, bankruptcy can
effectively end too-big-to-fail and simultaneously prevent the market turmoil caused in the
2008 crisis.
VII. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the resolution
of a SIFI is now possible to facilitate by the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, by
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implementing the SPOE mechanism into bankruptcy, the courts now have a sensible tool
they can use to resolve a SIFI, while preserving due process. 169 The SPOE approach
coupled with bankruptcy is one of the most important innovations to emerge after the
implementation of Dodd-Frank Act. Nevertheless, SPOE as implanted in bankruptcy, still
possess some concerns about speed and access to liquidity. 170 Based on the remaining
problems, it is likely that the government must still act as a lender of last resort, and it
remains to be seen whether the market conditions during a crisis allow for an SPOE
approach to work smoothly. Therefore, the elimination of the too-big-fail phenomenon is
unlikely, but it does take a step in the right direction solving the major issues surrounding
the 2008 financial crisis.
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